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ESTATES ON CONDITION AND ON SPECIAL
LIMITATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
FEDERICK B. MCCALL*
It shall be our purpose in this article to discuss the status of estates
on condition and on special limitation under the North Carolina law.
May the owner of land in fee simple absolute effectively transfer to
another a fee simple-or a lesser estate in such land-and yet place
such a limitation or condition upon the estate conveyed as will, upon
the happening of the stipulated contingency, cause the estate of the
grantee or devisee to be cut short and either automatically revert to the
grantor or his heirs, or be subject to their election to revest the title
in themselves? If so, how may such a qualified interest in the grantee
or devisee be created under our law? What is the nature of the interest
retained by the grantor or testator after he has created an estate on
special limitation or upon condition subsequent? These and other
problems incident to the creation of such estates will be discussed in
the hope that the law of North Carolina pertaining thereto will be
clarified.'
ESTATES ON SPECIAL LImITATION
Before we enter into a discussion of the North Carolina law as it
affects the valid erection of a: fee on special limitation, perhaps a brief
summary of some of the general propositions inherent in such an estate
might prove helpful.
Suppose A, the owner of Blackacre in fee simple, transfers by deed
or will the land "to B and his heirs so long as no apartment building
is erected on the premises". Assuming that the instrument of transfer
was validly executed, A has created in B a fee on special limitation, or,
as it is more commonly designated, a fee simple determinable. Here is
how he did it: in addition to the general limitation to B "and his heirs",
which of course gives B a fee simple estate, A has put in a clause of
special limitation-" so long as no apartment building is erected on the
premises"-which latter clause has the effect of automatically termi-
nating B's fee simple estate if the event specified occurs before the
time at which the estate generally limited to B would normally termi-
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1 The discussion in this article will be confined primarily to estates on special
limitation and on condition subsequent. Its scope does not contemplate any treat-
ment of the law pertaining to fees defeasible with a limitation over operating
either as a shifting use under the Statute of Uses or as an executory devise under
the Statute of Wills. Estates on condition precedent will receive only incidental
treatment.
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nate.2 As a result of the language used, B is said to have a fee simple
determinable estate in Blackacre. It is called a fee because of the
possibility of it continuing forever; it is said to be determinable because
its continuance may be cut short by the happening of the contingency
upon which it was further especially limited.3 The special limitation,
so long as, etc., is regarded as a part of the original limitation, as
marking out the utmost period of time during which the estate may
endure. If and when the event specified occurs, the estate automatically
comes to an end by virtue of its own limitation, and, without any action
on the part of A or his heirs, reverts back to them by operation
of law. Other apt words indicative of an intent on the part of a grantor
or testator to create an estate in fee simple which will automatically
expire upon the happening of the stated event-an estate on special
limitation-are "until", "while", "during"; or a provision that upon
the happening of the stated event "the land is to revert to the grantor". 4
The clause of special limitation, introduced by such words or phrases,
may be likened unto an automatic time bomb which, when set off by
the happening of the contingency specified, causes the entire fee simple
to cease and determine. In the illustration given above-if and when
an apartment house is erected on the premises conveyed by A to B,
the fee simple estate given to B automatically comes to an end. From
what we have just said about the use of certain apt or "groove" words
to create a 'determinable fee, it must not be inferred that such an estate
may not be created by other language.5 The intention on the part
of the grantor or testator to set up a determinable fee must be arrived
at by the courts upon a construction of all the language confined within
"the four corners of the instrument".
Of course, as Tiffany says, "it is necessary that the event named as
terminating the estate be such that it may by possibility never happen
at all, since it is an essential characteristic of a fee that it may possibly
endure forever".
Assuming in the illustration used above that A, owning a fee simple
absolute, has created in B a valid fee simple determinable, what interest
if any, does A have left in the land? He is said not to have an estate
in the land-because, according to the rigid doctrine of estates, there
can be no estate in reversion or remainder after the creation of any fee
simple estate in arother; therefore he is said to have merely a possibility
21 TIFFANY, REAL PROPEITY (3d ed. 1939) §217.
' First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524, 15 L. R. A.
231 (1892) ; see West v. Murphy, 197 N. C. 488, 490, 149 S. E. 731, 732 (1929).
'1 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1936) §44, Illus. 16, Comment (e); 1 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §218.
'1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §220.8 Ibid.
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of reacquiring the land upon the happening of the contingency named.
This possibility is known as a possibility of reverter. 7
It has been contended by writers of eminent authority in the field of
real property s that since the passage of the English Statute Quia
Enptores,9 it is impossible to create a determinable fee. The statute,
the effect of which was to abolish subinfeudation, provided that if A,
owning an estate in fee simple, alienated the land to B in fee simple, B
the feoffee should not hold the land by any tenurial relation to A but
should hold it of A's overlord, X. In other words, A would drop out
of the picture and there would no longer be any "reversionary" interest
in him by way of escheat-as obtained before the passage of Quia
Emptores. The statute reads, in part, as follows: "and it is to wit,
that this statute extendeth but only to lands holden in fee simple."' 0
Gray contended that the statute applied not only to fees simple absolute
but also to fees simple determinable; hence it was impossible for A
after the statute, to create the latter estate in B with the concomitant
possibility of reverter left in A. May we quote his argument: "Possi-
bilities of Reverter. These rights, as their name implies, were reversion-
ary rights; but a reversionary right implies tenure, and the Statute
Quia Emptores put an end to tenure between the feoffor of an estate
in fee simple and the feoffee. Therefore, since the Statute, there can
be no possibility of reverter remaining in the feoffor upon the con-
veyance of a fee; or, in other words, since the Statute, there can be no
fee with a special or collateral limitation, and the attempted imposition
of such a limitation is invalid."" Other writers 12 have taken the posi-
tion that Quia Emptores applied only to fees simple absolute and hence
did not include determinable fees. Despite Gray's argument, the
validity of determinable fees has been recognized in about eighteen
states in this country.' 8
Is North Carolina among those states which have recognized the
validity of the fee determinable, i.e., the fee simple on special limita-
tion? The direct question seems to have arisen first in the case of The
School Committee of Providence Township v. Kesler.'4 In that case
one Kesler in 1848 conveyed by deed land to a certain school committee
and their successors in office "to have and to hold ...as long as the
" For an interesting summary of the evolution of a possibility of reverter, see
1 SxIMEs, FUTURE INTmESTS (1936) §35, at p. 43.
'SANDERS, USES AND TRUSTS (5th ed. 1844); GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIEs (3d ed. 1915) §31.
18 EDw. 1, c. 1 (1290). 10Ibid.11 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §31.
12 CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) §437, and Powell, Determinable Fees
(1923) 23 CoL. L. REV. 207.1 2For citation of decisions in' the several states which have recognized the
validity of fees determinable, see I SIZMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) 178, n. 10;
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §220, n. 85.14 67 N. C. 443 (1872).
[Vol. 19
ESTATES ON CONDITION
system of common schools shall be continued at that place, or as long
as it shall not be applied to any other purpose except for schools of any
kind." In an action brought by the plaintiff school committee against
Kesler to recover for damages dione by him to the school house located
on the premises, the plaintiff proved that the school house had been used
by the old school committee for twenty-five or thirty years, and con-
tinuously up to the adoption of a new system; that in the year 1870-
two years before this suit was brought-a free school had been taught
in the house for two months. As one of his defenses to this action for
damages, the defendant insisted that the habendum clause in the deed,
as quoted above, had the legal effect of making the estate of the school
committee, existing in 1848, a "base or qualified fee" to said committee
and its successors, so long as the then existing system of public or
common schools should be in force; but that the estate terminated, by
its own limitation, when the system of common schools was changed
and a new system was adopted. He cited one of the classic examples of
a fee on special limitation: "An estate to A and his heirs, tenants of the
Manor of Dale, is at an end as soon as they cease to be tenants of the
Manor of Dale". The court refused to accept as valid this contention
of the defendant and flatly held that a base or qualified fee had never
been in use or in force in this state, or recognized by its laws for the
reasons that, first, it was contrary to public policy; and, second, that
such a limitation or qualification in the defendant's deed was repugnant
to and inconsistent with the nature of the grant and therefore void. As
to the first reason, the court said: ". . . great detriment would arise
and much confusion of rights, if parties were allowed to invent new
modes of holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon land
a peculiar character which should follow the land into all hands, how-
ever remote". As to the second reason the court said: "The condition
or qualification being repugnant, and inconsistent with the object of the
grant, is void and must be rejected in the same way that a condition
annexed to an estate in fee simple, that the grantee should not alien
... is rejected and treated as surplusage, as repugnant to the nature of
the estate". At no point in the decision did the court refer to Quia
Emptores as it might affect the creation of such an estate in North
Carolina.
It is interesting to note that, despite Judge Pearson's statement in
the instant case to the effect that a base or qualified fee had never been
in force or use in this state, he himself had directly held in an earlier
case'5 that such an estate had been created by the deed involved in
that case.
Since the court in the Kesler case 16 reached the further conclusion
1" Merriman v. Russell, 55 N. C. 470, 472 (1856). 1" See note 14, supra.
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that the condition or qualification in the deed had not been violated and,
furthermore, that the deed did not contain apt and proper terms "to
create a condition, or a qualification, or even a covenant to run with
the land," what was said by the court with reference to the creation
of what it termed "a base or qualified fee" might be regarded merely
as dicta.
Twenty years later in the case of Hall v. Turner17 the problem of
whether or not a fee determinable-a fee on special limitation-might
be validly created in North Carolina, was again presented to the court.
In that case Hall entered into a sealed agreement with Turner whereby
Hall "consents for the said Turner to back water, if necessary, up into
his field, on condition that the said Turner will allow Hall as much
woodland along the line fence on the south of the river. Said Turner
is allowed to raise a dam eight or nine feet high. This agreement to
remain good so long as'8 the said Turner keeps up a mill... afterwards
to be null and void". A controversy subsequently arose between Hall
and Turner which involved primarily, the construction of the agree-
ment to determine the quality of the interest held by Turner in the land
under the agreement-whether he had a mere personal right to flood
Hall's land, which would terminate at his death, or whether he had
guch an estate in the land as would descend to his heirs. The court
held as follows: "We are of the opinion . . . that Turner and his heirs
took, in equity, an easement to overflow the land of Hall, determinable
when they ceased to keep up the said mill. In this respect it is a
limitation. But it is to be observed that this base, qualified or determin-
able fee (we prefer the term qualified) is liable to be defeated by the
failure of Turner 'to allow the said L. W. Hall as much woodland along
the line fence on the south side of the river.' In this particular, the
estate in the easement is an estate upon condition . . ." In the course
of its decision in the instant case the court commented, upon the Kesler
case' 9 and said that it was impossible to reconcile the conflicting utter-
ances of Judge Pearson on the subject of base or qualified tees; that
however broad the language used by that learned jurist" on the sub-
ject "we have no idea that it was the purpose of the Chief Justice
to say that the limitation expressly defined by him as a base or qualified
fee in Merriman's case could not be made in North Carolina. Such
limitations are not infrequent in this and other states and we are not
prepared to adopt a view which leads to such a revolution in the law
of limitations of real property' Thus in polite and euphemistic lan-
guage the court overruled the dogmatic statement of Judge Pearson in
the Kesler case that base or qualified fees (i.e., fees on special limita-
17fl10 N. C. 292, 14 S. E. 791 (1892).
" Italics ours. iS See note 14, supra.
[Vol. 19
ESTATES ON CONDITION
tion) have no place in the North Carolina law. While the interest
dealt with in Hall v. Turner as well as in the subsequent case of Ruffin
v. Seaboard Air Line Railway,20 was an easement, and while no case
has been found in which the problem was squarely raised in connection
with a full fee interest in the land itself,21 yet it can be readily inferred
from the broad, non-exclusive language of the Hall case as well as from
dicta in succeeding cases, 22 in which a fee in the land was involved,
that a person either by deed or will may validly place such a limitation
or qualification upon a fee simple estate in. land as will cause the fee
to terminate automatically sooner than it normally would. This being
so, it follows that prior to the happening of the stipulated event, there
would remain in the grantor or testator a possibility of reverter. That
the Statute of Quia Emptores does not forbid the creation of such inter-
ests in North Carolina is clearly recognized by the court in the case of
Sharpe v. North Carolina Railroad Company, decided in 1925.23
It will be apparent to the reader who has endured us thus far that
there is considerable confusion in the nomenclature used to identify
this fee simple estate which may not live out its normal life because of
some limitation or qualification imposed upon it by its creator. It will
be recalled that Judge Pearson in the Kesler case 24 denominated it as a
"base or qualified fee". In Hall v. Turner25 the court spoke of it as
a "base, qualified or determinable fee", but preferred to call it a
"qualified fee". In Ruffin v. Seaboard Air Line Railway2 6 it was
called a "eterminable fee". Even in this article we have spoken of it
interchangeably as a "fee determinable" or a "fee on special limitation".
What should the child be named? Modern authorities27 have given it
the appellation "fee simple determinable", shortened to "determinable
fee". This is what we prefer to call it. Analytically, in terms of its
20 151 N. C. 330, 66 S. E. 317 (1909).
" In Davis v. Frazier, 150 N. C. 447, 64 S. E. 193 (1909), a deed to standing
timber contained a clause giving the grantee the right to enter upon the lands and
cut and remove the timber within five years from a specified date, followed by a
clause providing that the grantee should not have the right to cut over the timber
a second time. It was held that the second clause conveyed a base or qualifiedfee in the specified dimensions of timber, determinable as to all timber not cut
and removed from the land within the five years, and subject to the further pro-
vision that the land should not be cut over a second time for timber.
22Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 513, 514, 32 S. E. 809, 812 (1899) ; SaintPeter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N. C. 126, 56 S. E. 688, 691 (1907); West v.
Murphy, 197 N. C. 488, 490, 149 S. E. 731, 732 (1929) ; Sharpe v. North Carolina
R. R., 190 N. C. 350, 352, 129 S. E. 826, 827 (1925).
" See note 22, supra. It should be noted, however, that since the court in this
case was dealing with a fee on condition subsequent, what was said by it (in a
confused statement of the law) regarding Quia Emptores and possibilities of
reverter must be regarded as dicta. See note 14, supra.22 See note 17, supra. 28 See note 20, supra.
' 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §220; Powell, Determinable
Fees (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 207; 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §177 et
scq.; 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) §44.
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creation, a fee determinable is really a fee on special limitation, as con-
trasted with a fee on condition subsequent, with which we shall deal
presently in the article. Hence, for the purpose of our discussion
we have felt justified in using the interchangeable terminology-"fee
determinable" or "fee on special limitation". We trust, however, that
our court will abandon the use of the language "base or qualified" to
describe such a fee, because such terminology is not only confusing but
it is technically inaccurate 2
8
Before we complete our discussion of determinable fees in North
Carolina we should like to call attention to the recent case of Bernard
v. Bowen.2 9 In that case one Matthews in 1848 conveyed by deed a
tract of land to certain named commissioners of a school district and
their successors, for the purppse of enabling them to build a school
house and church, said land to be held "so long as a church is kept up
on said lot and not to be used for any other purpose, and if at any time
they should be discontinued or fail, the title to said lot to revert back
to me (the grantor) and my heirs". A school house was immedately
erected on the premises and was used for school and church purposes
until 1878, when a church building was erected on an adjacent lot
and the school building ceased to be used for church purposes. The
use of the building for school purposes was continued uninterruptedly
until 1936 when the school board offered the premises for sale, but
such sale was never consummated. In 1937 the school furniture was
removed from the building and was placed in a high school building
newly erected on an adjoining tract of land. During that year, how-
ever, the school board resumed the use of the old building for labora-
tory purposes in connection with the high school. The offer to sell was
also definitely withdrawn. The plaintiff as an heir of Matthews, the
original grantor, instituted suit to recover the land. He claimed that
the title thereto had reverted because there had been an abandonment
of the purposes for which the land had originally been conveyed. The
court, proceeding upon the assumption that Matthews' deed had created
in the school board a fee simple on condition subsequent, held that the
"8 In 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §220, n. 81, the author, citing
authorities, points out that: "The term 'base fee' is perhaps more properly applied
only to the estate .which arises in the grantee of a tenant in tail upon the barring
of the issue in tail by any act which is ineffectual to bar the reversion expectant
on the estate tail .... The term 'qualified fee' is by Preston and Challis applied
to an estate which is limited to a man and certain of his heirs only, as to a man
and the heirs of his father; but such an estate ... has rarely, if ever, occurred."
In order to obviate much of the confusion which has arisen in the law from
the use of indiscriminate and divergent terminology, the Restatement has steered
away from the use of such terms as "base fee", "conditional fee", "qualified fee",
and "fee on conditional limitation" and has designated it "fee simple determin-
able". See 1 RESTATEitENT, PRoPRaTY (1936) Introductory Note to Ch. 4; also,§44. " "214 N. C. 121, 198 S. E. 584 (1938).
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plaintiff was not entitled to recover for two reasons: (1) that, upon
the facts presented, there had been no abandonment of the premises
for school purposes; (2) that, since for fifty-nine years the heirs of
the grantor had acquiesced in the non-user of the premises for church
purposes, any right of forfeiture, which might have been exercised by
them by reason of such non-user, would be deemed to have been waived
and lost by lapse of time, and, therefore the, right of re-entry barred.
This case is of interest to us at this point in our discussion because,
on the basis of the language employed by the grantor in the deed, there
would seem to be 'an almost perfect set-up for the creation of a fee
determinable and not a fee on condition subsequent. The clause "so
long as3o a church is kept up on said lot and not to be used for any
other purposes" would seem to place a special limitation upon the
estate already generally limited and to mark out further the utmost
period of time the estate in the school board could endure. The addi-
tional provision-"and if at any time they should be discontinued
or fail, the title to said land to revert back to me (the grantor) and my
heirs"--would seem simply to spell out what would happen automati-
cally by operation of law.3 ' In, other words, if the deed had contained
only the first clause, "so long as ... etc.", and nothing else, the estate
in the school board would have, upon the happening of the contingency
stipulated in the clause, ceased and determined by its own limitation
and the full fee simple title would have automatically reverted to the
grantor or his heirs. As Professor Simes says: "No express words of
reverter are necessary. Indeed, they would seem to be mere surplusage
if present."32  Clearly, if A, owning a tract of land in fee simple,
should convey the same "to B for life and at his death to revert back to
me or my heirs in fee simple", he has spelled out what would have hap-
pened anyway by operation of law. In law, A wofld have attained
precisely the same objective if he had used the normal, short-hand
statement--"to B for life". If, as the court held in the instant case,
the grantor Matthews created a fee on condition subsequent, the land
would not have, upon the failure of the grantee to maintain a church
upon the premises, "reverted" to the grantor or his heirs-this, despite
the provision that the title should "revert". 3 As we shall later point
out, an estate on condition subsequent does not automatically come to
an end upon the breach of the condition. It continues in effect until
the grantor or his heirs elect to terminate it and revest the title in them-
" Italics ours.
"See 1 RESTATEmENT, PROPEiTY (1936) §44(1), illustration 17, V.
"1 SiMEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936) §181.
"Phelps v. Chessun, 34 N. C. 194, 199 (1851) ; Robinson v. Ingram, 126 N. C.
327, 85 S. E. 612 (1900).
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selves either by actually re-entering upon the land or by bringing a
suit in ejectment to recover it."
If we concede the soundness of the foregoing argument that, on a
technical basis, the court should have found that the grantor created a
fee determinable estate, is there any rational basis upon which we may
justify the decision of the court that the grantor set up an estate in fee
simple upon condition subsequent? We think there is, for several rea-
sons. First of all, a court is not absolutely bound by the technical or
nontechnical language, used by the draftsman of an instrument, in its
endeavor to arrive at a construction consonant with what it deems to
be the probable intent of the party grantor in such an instrument. Ob-
viously such an intent must be found by a scrutiny of the instrument
according to the whole tenor thereof. Secondly, the court undoubtedly
was influenced in its decision that the deed created a fee on condition
subsequent because of the appearance in the deed of a clause of condi-
tion followed by provision for a "reversion" of the title if the condition
were not fulfilled. This conclusion could be logically reached by virtue
of the fact that our court has consistently held that a fee on condition
subsequent can not be created unless the instrument purporting to create
it contains language expressly providing for forfeiture, or reentry, or
"reversion" upon breach of the stipulated condition. 5 In the third
place, the most compelling factor which would justify the court in
reaching the conclusion that Matthews had created a fee on condition
subsequent, was the fact that for fifty-nine years after the grantee had
ceased to use the premises for church purposes, neither the grantor nor
his heirs had asserted any right to the property. Obviously, if the deed
had been construed to create a fee 'determinable, the title to the land,
immediately upon the cessation of its use for church purposes, would
have automatically reverted to the grantor or his heirs, and the status
of their title would be considerably clouded by virtue of the continued
use and occupation by the grantees for the succeeding fifty-nine years.
Whether or not the grantees would have acquired the title by fifty-nine
years of adverse possession would depend in turn upon the answer
to the question: had the grantees continued to hold the land under the
original deed and therefore in subordination to the grantor, or had they
begun to assert title in their own right as of the time they discontinued
the use of the land for church purposes. The court solved the problem
of title by deciding that the deed had created a fee on cojndition subse-
"Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 271, 84 S. E. 280 (1915).
"Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507 (1908); Shannonhouse v.
Wolfe, 191 N. C. 769, 133 S. E. 93 (1926); Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. C. 298,
1 S. E. (2d) 845 (1939). These and many other cases will be considered in a
subsequent part of this article which will deal directly with the problem of how




quent. This meant, of course, that the grantees had a fee simple subject
to be defeated only if and when the grantor or his heirs should elect to
reclaim the land within a reasonable time after the condition was
breached. The right of forfeiture, not having been exercised for fifty-
nine years, was deemed by the court to have been waived and lost by
lapse of time. The grantor's right of reentry-his "string" tied to the
grantee's fee'-was severed and destroyed; his grantee now held an inde-
feasible fee simple estate in the land. Thus on a practical, economic
basis the title to the land was cleared. For these several reasons we
feel that the court was justified in construing the deed to have created a
fee simple on condition subsequent instead of a fee determinable.
However well tiecided the foregoing case may have been from the
standpoint of desirability of result, it does create forthe conveyancer this
very practical problem: how may a technical fee simple determinable
be created in North Carolina? What terminology should be used in the
deed or will? We suggest.that perhaps it might be done in the follow-
ing way. Suppose A, who owns a tract of land in fee simple, desires to
convey said land to the town of Chapel Hill to be used for park and
playground purposes but also desires that the title to the land, upon
the cessation of such uses, should return automatically to him or his
heirs. Conceivably, A might word the deed to effectuate this purpose as
follows: "A conveys the premises herein described to the Board of
Aldermen of the Town of Chapel Hill, and their successors in office,
so long as the. said land is used for park and playground purposes, and
no longer; it being the express intention of the grantor hereby to con-
vey to the said grantees a fee simple determinable estate in said land
and not a fee simple estate on condition subsequent; and, when the
said premises cease to be used for park and playground purposes, then
at that time the title to said premises shall automatically by operation of
law and without reentry or suit on his or, their part, be revested in the
said grantor, A; or if A be dead, in his heirs".
Since, as we have shown, it is possible to create a fee simple
determinable in North Carolina, obviously a determinable estate of lesser
dignity can be created. Indeed our court has so held in the case of
Stancil v. Calvert.3 6 In that case where A agreed to let B put a saw-
mill, houses and fixtures on A's land for the purpose of carrying on the
business of sawing lumber as long as B wished, and when B wished he
could remove the mill, fixtures, etc., it was held that B had a life in-
terest in the land necessary to the business, determinable sooner at B's
option. The estate may last for B's life or it may come to an end
sooner at B's option. In such a case A holds both a: possibility of
reverter should B exercise his option to quit the lumber business before
-0 60 N. C. 104 (1863).
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his death and also a true reversion in fee should B continue the business
until his death. A determinable life estate of more frequent occurrence
is created when a testator 'devises real estate to his wife during her
widowhood, or to her until she remarry.87
Like a life estate, a tenant's estate for years may be subject to a
special limitation by which such estate may come to an end upon the
happening of some contingency before the end of the term.88 Here
again the lessor will have both a possibility of reverter and a reversion
in fee expectant upon the termination of the determinable estate for
years. ESTATES ON CONDITION
For the purposes of this article our discussion of estates on condi-
tion will be confined, for the most part, to estates on condition subse-
quent-their creation and some of their incidents, and a comparison of
them with estates on special limitation under the North Carolina law.
Before we enter into a discussion of the specific problems involving
estates on condition, some generalizations concerning such estates seem
to be in order. An estate on condition expressed in the grant itself
occurs where an estate is granted either in fee simple or otherwise,
with an express qualification annexed, whereby the estate granted shall
either commence, be enlarged, or be defeated, upon performance or
breach of such qualification or condition; and a condition subsequent
is one which operates upon an estate already created or vested, render-
ing it liable to be defeated if the condition is broken.89 As to the
distinction between estates on condition precedent and on condition
subsequent, our Court states: "There is this familiar distinction between
a condition precedent and a condition subsequent: If the condition is
precedent, inasmuch as the estate does not vest at all until such
condition happens, the effect of its being unlawful or impossible is that
the estate dependent upon it fails, and the grant or &Ievice becomes
wholly void; and where a condition precedent consists of several parts
united by copulative conjunction, each part must be performed before
the estate can vest. A condition subsequent, if it has any effect, defeats
an estate already vested; but if such condition is impossible or unlawful
at the time of creating the estate, or becomes impossible by the act of
the feoffor or the act of God, it leaves the estate an absolute and uncon-
ditional one, since it is the condition itself that is or becomes void." 40
37 re Will of R. C. Miller, 159 N. C. 123, 74 S. E. 888 (1912).
3See Stedman v. McIntosh, 26 N. C. 291, 295 (1844); I TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §§148, 219.
8' Such is the definition of an estate on condition given by the North Carolina
court in Hall v. Quinn, 190 N. C. 326, 328, 130 S. E. 18, 20 (1925), citing 2
BLACKSTONE Comm. *154.
40 Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 271, 274, 84 S. E. 280, 281 (1915). This case




Perhaps the leading case in North Carolina involving an estate on
condition precedent is Tilley v. King.41 In that case the testator devised
land to his widow for life, "and if Powell H. Tilley stays with us until
after our deaths, and takes care of us, then I give and bequeath this tract
of land to him forever." It was held that the requirement that Powell H.
Tilley should remain with the testator and his wife and care for them
until their deaths constituted a conoition precedent to the vesting of
the estate in the land devised to him; that this was so on the clear
words of the will notwithstanding there was no ulterior limitation over
of such estate.
It is often difficult to determine from the wording of a deed or will
whether the condition is to be regarded as precedent or subsequent.
"Whether a condition is a precedent or subsequent one depends upon
the intention of the grantor or testator to be gathered from the whole
instrument. Whether it be precedent or subsequent is a question purely
of intent, and the intention must be determined by considering, not only
the words of the particular clause, but also the language of the whole
contract, as well as the nature of the act required and the subject mat-
ter to which it relates." 42
A case might be put which, conceivably, would give a court some
trouble in ascertaining whether the maker of the instrument intended
to create an estate on condition precedent or one on condition subse-
quent. For example, suppose A by deed conveys a tract of land "to B
and his heirs provided B supports me (A) for the rest of my life; but
if B fails to do so then this deed is to be void.143 Must B support A for
the rest of A's life as a condition precedent to the vesting of any title
in B; or does B take title immediately, subject to divestment if B fails
to support A ? The court construing this instrument would probably
arrive at the conclusion that B took an immediate estate in the land
subject to divestment if he failed to perform-that the estate was upon
a condition subsequent. In arriving at this conclusion the court would
be aided by some generally accepted rules of construction. If possible,
the construction will be in favor of the condition as subsequent, rather
than precedent, so that the grantee or devisee may have an estate liable
to be divested rather than one whose vesting is 'deferred.44 The North
Carolina court states the rule as follows: "If the act on which the
estate depends does not necessarily precede the vesting of the estate,
," 109 N. C. 461, 13 S. E. 936 (1891). See also Harris v. Wright, 118 N. C.
422, 24 S. E. 751 (1896).
"Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C. 206, 211, 49 S. E. 110, 112 (1904).
"The North Carolina court had difficulty with a substantially similar fact
situation in Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C. 206, 49 S. E. 110 (1904).
" St. Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N. C. 126, 56 S. E. 688 (1907) ; 1 TIF-
FANY, Rm_. PaoPmRTv (3d ed. 1939) §194.
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but may accompany it or follow it, if this is to be collected from the
whole instrument, the condition is subsequent." 4 Evincive of their
general hostility to conditions, the courts tend to construe conditions
precedent in favor of vesting the estate and conditions subsequent
against divesting it.46
ESTATES ON CONDITION SUBSEQUENT
According to the Restatement of Property "an estate in fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent is created by an otherwise effective
conveyance which contains (1) some one of the following phrases,
namely, 'upon condition that', or 'provided that', or a phrase of like
import; and also (2) a provision that if a stated event occurs, the
conveyor 'may enter and terminate the estate hereby conveyed', or a
phrase of like import".47 Suppose, then, that A, the owner of Blackacre
in fee simple transfers by a validly executed deed or will the land "to
B and his heirs upon the express condition that if an apartment build-
ing is erected upon the premises hereby conveyed, A may enter and
terminate the estate hereby created". A has created in B a fee simple
estate but it is subject to a condition subsequent--"if an apartment
house is erected upon the premises". Upon the happening of that event
A or his heirs, at their election, may forfeit B's estate and take the
land. Unlike a fee determinable, the happening of the contingency
does not cause the land automatically to revert back to A; the fee will
continue in B until A exercises his option to retake the land.48 The
right retained by A after creating in B the fee on condition subsequent
is called "a right of entry for condition broken", or, a "power of
termination". It will be recalled that the interest left in A after he
created a fee determinable, or fee on special limitation, in B was de-
nominated a "possibility of reverter". The courts often confuse the
technical distinction between the two by calling them, interchangeably,
"possibilities of reverter". In this respect a roll call would find the
North Carolina court on the list of offenders. 49
"Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C. 206, 49 S. E. 110 (1904); Lynch v. Melton,
150 N. C. 595, 64 S. E. 497 (1909).
"' Barco v. Owens, 212 N. C. 30, 192 S. E. 862 (1937); 1 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §193.471 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1936) 139, §45(j-1); also, in re apt words to
create an estate on condition subsequent, see I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.
1939) §190, and Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. C. 298, 1 S. E. (2d) 845 (1939).
48 Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 271, 84 S. E. 280 (1915).
"In cases involving fees on condition subsequent our court almost invariably
speaks of the interest left in the grantor as a possibility of reverter. See, for
example, Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C. 206, 209, 49 S. E. 110, 111 (1904) ; Sharpe
v. North Carolina R. R., 190 N. C. 350, 352, 129 S. E. 826, 827 (1925) ; Methodist
Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N. C. 8, 13, 40 S. E. 691, 693 (1903) where
the court said: "There must remain in the grantor at least a possibility of re-
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Logically, it would seem that there should be very little difference
in the estate created in B, whether A, in his deed or will, says "to
B and his heirs so long as no apartment house is erected on the prem-
ises" or "to B and his heirs provided that no apartment house is erected
on the premises". In eacfi instance B has a fee simple which may con-
tinue for its natural duration and yet, due to the contingency named
therein, may possibly determine before the end of such period. Tech-
nically, however, the law sees more than a verbal distinction between
the two estates: in the former B is said to have a determinable fee-a
fee on special limitation; in the latter he is said to have a fee on con-
dition subsequent. Tiffany differentiates the two estates as follows:
"There is, however, a fundamental distinction between an estate on
condition and one on special limitation, in that, while in the former
case the words which provide for the termination of the estate on a con-
tingency are not regarded as part of the original limitation of the estate,
but are considered to provide for the cutting off of the estate before
its proper termination, in the case of an estate on special limitation the
words of contingency are regarded as part of the limitation itself, and:
so as not cutting off an estate previously limited, but as merely naming
an alternative limit to the duration of the estate".5 ° Since a determinable
fee comes to an end, upon the happening of the contingency, by virtue
of its own special limitation, there is no estate left in the grantee and
necessarily the right of possession automatically reverts to the grantor.
Since in a fee on condition subsequent the contingency named is n6t
regarded as a part of the original limitation of the estate (i.e., "to B and
his heirs") the estate is not automatically ended by the breach of the
condition. The estate in fee continues in B until A revests the title in
himself by exercising his right of entry. At common law it was held
that an-actual entry upon the land was necessary, for the reason that,
since the estate was created by a solemn act, viz., a grant and livery of
seisin, it must be defeated and restored to the grantor by an act equally
solemn. "But", says our court in Brittain v. Taylor,5 ' "this view has
long since ceased to obtain, and any act equivalent to an entry is now
considered as sufficient in place of an entry, and numerous cases hold
that a possessory action may be maintained upon the breach of a con-
dition subsequent without a prior re-entry or demand of possession,
such an action being equivalent thereto".
verier, which, while not an estate, is in itself a right coupled with the contingent
right of entry".
50 1 TvFAxy, REAL POPERrY (3d ed. 1939) §217. For an excellent discussion
distinguishing the two types of estates, see Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Buck,
79 N. J. Eq. 472, 82 Atl. 418 (1912).
"t 168 N. C. 271, 275, 84 S. E. 280, 282 (1915).
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Occasionally, the courts themselves are confused by the technical
distinction, just discussed, between fees determinable and fees on con-
dition subsequent. The Ohio court, in considering a case52 whose facts
would normally call for a fee determinable,53 devoted almost the entire
opinion to a 'discussion of estates on condition subsequent, and held
that since the deed in question contained no provision for a reversion
of the property to the grantor, only a covenant regarding the use of
the property was created. Similarly, the North Carolina court in
Sharpe v. North Carolina Railroad Company,54 on a set of facts which
were recognized by the court as creating a fee on condition subsequent,"
held that "the bare possibility of a reverter under a condition subsequent
is not assignable at common law", but may be released. The court then
said: "Such provisions providing for a forfeiture upon breach of con-
dition subsequent create a determinable fee,"50 and proceeded to cite
numerous authorities, including the leading Massachusetts case of Fitst
Universalist Society v. Boland5r and the North Carolina case of Hall
v. Turner,58 which dealt with the creation and validity of technical fees
determinable and not with fees on condition subsequent.
It would seem obvious that, if a fee simple on condition subsequent
may be created, a life estate or an estate for years may be created
subject to such a condition. For instance A may convey property "to
B' for life, provided B live in Durham". And, one of the most comnon
instances in which an estate on condition subsequent is created is where
A leases property to B for a term of years and stipulates that if a
certain covenant, such as the payment of rent or the making of repairs,
is not performed by B, the lessor may declare the lease forfeited and
re-enter on the premises. Assuming that A is the owner of the prem-
ises in fee simple, in both instances he has retained a reversion in fee
and also has a right of entry for condition broken. Both estates may
continue for their normal duration or may be cut short by A upon B's
breach of the stipulated condition.
"' In re Matter of Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St.
309, 166 N. E. 218 (1929).
11 R granted property to the trustees of the M. E. Church . . . "so long as
said lot is used for church purposes". See dissenting opinion to the effect that
the deed created a determinable fee.
' 190 N. C. 350, 129 S. E. 826 (1925).
" The Railroad Company conveyed land to F, with the provision that "if the
said ... [F] ... keep up or maintain any house of ill-fame or house for the sale
of . . . liquors or for any species of gaming on said lot or any part thereof, then
in that case their right, title and property in and to the lot aforesaid shall be
forfeited and revert to the North Carolina Railroad Company."
11 Italics ours.17 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524 (1891).
" 110 N. C. 292, 14 S. E. 791 (1892), discussed in the first part of this article
under the heading of Estates on Special Limitation.
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THE CREATION OF ESTATES ON CONDITION SUBSEQUENT IN
NORTH CAROLINA
We come now to a consideration of the problem: how may an
estate on condition subsequent be validly created under the North
Carolina law? We shall be concerned first with the creation of condi-
tions expressed or "in deed"; conditions implied, or "in law", will be
discussed later.
North Carolina agrees with the majority view that conditions sub-
sequent, which work a forfeiture of the estate conveyed, should be
strictly construed, as such conditions are not favored in the law and
are to be taken most strongly against the grantor to prevent forfeiture.59
In Vinson v. Wise,'0 our court said: "a clause in a deed will be con-
strued as a covenant, unless apt words of condition are used, and even
then it will not be held to create a condition unless it is apparent from
the whole instrument and the circumstances that a strict condition was
intended". Obviously, whether or not an estate on condition subsequent
or some other estate was created is a matter of intention on the part
of the parties, and such intent must be arrived at upon a construction
of the instrument as a whole. To ascertain this intention, the court
will look "to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation
of the parties, and the state of the thing granted."' 1
It being conceded that the North Carolina court will construe
strictly conditions subsequent, the further question arises: how strictly
will it construe them? The answer will diepend somewhat upon the
ritualistic significance given by the court to the words or phrases used
by the grantor or testator to express his intention. In Shields v. Har-
ris,62 the. court said: "To every good expressed condition is required
an external form, that is, sufficient words to declare an intent in the
party to have the estate conditional; and an internal form, that is, such
matter as whereof a condition may be made. Shep. Touchstone, vol. 1,
*126 (241) . . . The usual and proper technical words [are] such
as 'provided', 'so as', 'on condition', or those mentioned by Lord Coke
when he says: 'words of condition are sub conditione, ita quod, proviso',
or the words "si or 'quod contingat" and similar terms with the clause
of forfeiture or re-entry. Coke on Littleton, 203a, 203b, 204a .... Al-
though certain words are appropriate for the creation of a condition,
no particular words are necessarily required, for rules of construction
"9 Hinton v. Vinson, 180 N. C. 393, 104 S. E. 897 (1920) ; Shields v. Harris,
190 N. C. 520, 130 S. E. 189 (1925); Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. C. 298, 1 S E.(2d) 845 (1939); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §192.
80180 N. C. 393, 396, 104 S. E. 897, 899 (1920).81Vinson v. Wise, 180 N. C. 393, 398, 104 S. E. 897, 899 (1920).82190 N. C. 520, 524, 525, 130 S. E. 189, 191 (1925).
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are guides to find the intention of the parties expressed by the whole
instrument."
Assuming that the proper subject matter-"the internal form"--for
the creation of a valid63 condition subsequent is present in the instru-
ment, what words will the North Carolina court deem to be sufficient
"to declare an intent in the party to have the estate conditional" so as
to work a forfeiture? It is generally recognized by the authorities 4 that
the use of the apt words---"on condition that", "upon the express con-
dition", "provided", "so that", "but if", and similar language-are suf-
ficient in themselves to create a .condition subsequent with right of
entry for the breach thereof, and that it is not essential to the creation
of the condition that there be also included in the instrument an express
clauese providing for a re-entry or for a reverter or for a forfeiture. Yet
the North Carolina court has reached the acme in strictness of con-
struction by holding that regardless of the other language used in the
instrument, a condition subsequent is not created unless the grantor or
testator expressly reserves the right to re-enter, or provides for a for-
feiture or for a reversion, or that the instrument shall be null and
void.6 5 It seems, therefore, that if the instrument contains both the
apt words to create a condition and an express clause of re-entry, re-
verter, or forfeiture, our court will generally hold that an estate on con-
"' The scope of this article does not contemplate a discussion of conditions
impossible of performance: (see Harris v. Wright, 118 N. C. 422, 24 S. E. 751
(1896); Lynch v. Melton, 150 N. C. 595, 64 S. E. 497 (1909)); nor of illegal
conditions: (see Watts v. Griffin, 137 N. C. 572, 50 S. E. 218 (1905)); nor of
conditions in restraint of marriage: (see Monroe v. Hall, 97 N. C. 206, 1 S. R.
651 (1887) ; Watts v. Griffin, 137 N. C. 572, 50 S. E. 218 (1905) ; In re Will of
Miller, 159 N. C. 123, 74 S. E. 888 (1912); Gard v. Mason, 169 N. C. 507, 86
S. E. 302 (1915) ; Bryan v. Harper, 177 N. C. 308, 98 S. E. 822 (1919)) ; nor
of conditions in restraint of alienation: (see Latimer v. Waddell, 119 N. C. 370,
26 S. E. 122 (1896); Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C. 460, 48 S. E. 785 (1904);
Norwood v. Crowder, 177 N. C. 469, 99 S. E. 345 (1919) ; Douglass v. Stevens,
214 N. C. 688, 200 S. E. 366 (1938)) ; nor of repugnant conditions: (see Barco v.
Owens, 212 N. C. 30, 192 S. E. 862 (1937)).
"I SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §163; 1 TIFFAN-, REAL PROPERTY (3d
ed. 1939) §190.
"Helms v. Helms, 135 N. C. 164. 47 S. E. 415 (1904); Braddy v. Elliott,
146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507 (1908) ; Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 271, 84 S. E.
280 (1915); First Presbyterian Church v. Sinclair Refining Company, 200 N. C.
469, 157 S. E. 438 (1931); Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. C. 298, 1 S. E. (2d) 845
(1939); Williams v. Thompson, 216 N. C. 292, 4 S. E. (2d) 609 (1939). But
see Lynch v. Melton, 150 N. C. 595, 64 S. E. 497 (1909) where the testatrix
devised land to her niece "provided she lives with her said uncle until she becomes
free, by age or marriage, otherwise to go as the law directs". The child was
forced to leave the home of her uncle because of the latter's insanity. The court
recognized the validity of the condition but held that, because of impossibility
of performance, the niece took an absolute fee in the land. See also Douglass v.
Stevens, 214 N. C. 688, 200 S. E. 366 (1939), where the testator devised land
to his children "with the condition that they shall in no wise either sell or mort-
gage said property for a period of not less than 50 years". The court held that
"the condition subsequent" was void as being an absolute restraint on alienation.
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dition subsequent has been created.66 But, even in such a situation, we
find the court searching for and seizing upon any circumstance which
will justify a construction hostile to a condition and the forfeiture con-
sequent upon a breach thereof. Some interesting cases have been
found. In Robinson v. Ingrai 67 a father, by deed -dated December 12,
1865, conveyed property in trust to two of his sons, the property to be
managed by them for the support of their father and mother during
their lives and after their deaths to divide the property equally among
the grantor's children. The trust deed contained this clause: "That if
the trustees should violate any of the trust embraced in the foregoing
conveyance, then the said conveyance to be utterly null and void and
the property revert to the grantor and his heirs". On February 27,
1882, one of the trustees together with some of the other children
mortgaged the land, described in the trust deed, to secure a loan. On
the 24th of February, 1882, the sheriff under executions against, the
grantor had levied on the land and sold his interest to the defendant.
The grantor outlived his wife and died in 1894. The plaintiffs, claim-
ing both as heirs of the grantor and by virtue of the trust deed, sued
in 1899 to recover the land. The defendants claimed under the execu-
tion sale and further claimed that since the trustee and other children
had mortgaged the land, and since the trustees had failed to support
the grantor-these two circumstances avoided the deed of trust, put
the title to the land back-in the grantor.and subjected his land to the
execution and sheriff's deed, under which they claimed. Although the
court sent the case back for retrial because of the failure to join proper
parties,. it held that the trustee's mortgage was invalid; that no title0 ethodist Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N. C. 8, 40 S. E. 691 (1902).
(One Harris conveyed to trustees of a church land upon which to build a
church; that "if such church discontinue the occupancy of said lot in the manner
aforesaid, then this deed shall become null and void and the said lot or parcel
of ground shall revert to the said W. A. Harris and his heirs and assigns for-
ever.') ; Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 271, 84 S. E. 280 (1915) ("The said deed
is made on this special trust: That the said . . . Taylor is to feed, clothe, and
kindly care for the said Margaret Taylor all her natural life, and should the said
. . . Taylor fail to feed, clothe and kindly care for the said Margaret Taylor,
then this deed is to be null and void.'); Huntley v. McBrayer, 169 N. C. 75,
85 S. E. 213 (1915) (H and his wife conveyed land to the parties of the second
part in consideration that the latter support the former as long as the grantors
or either of them should live, "but if the parties of the second part should fail to
comply with their part of the agreement this is all void and of no effect".) ;
Sharpe v. North Carolina R. R., 190 N. C. 350, 129 S. E. 826 (1925) (See note
55, supra, for language held by the court to be effective to create a condition
subsequent in this case) ; Bernard v. Bowen, 214 N. C. 121, 198 S. E. 584 (1938)
(Land conveyed to school commissioners for the purpose of enabling them to
build a schoolhouse and church, said land to be held "so long as church is kept
on said lot and not to be used for any other purpose, and if at any time they
should be discontinued or fail, the title to said lot to revert back to me (the
grantor) and my heirs"). Cf., especially with the Bernard case, Blue v. Wilming-
ton, 186 N. C. 321, 119 S. E. 741 (1923).07 126 N. C. 327, 35 S. E. 612 (1900).
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passed to the defendant by the levy and sale made by the sheriff since
at that time the grantor had no interest subject to sale under execution;
that he had only the right to be supported out of the profits of the
property during his life, which he had received. The court said: "The
proposition that any violation of the trust embraced in the deed would
nullify and avoid the conveyance, and that the property would revert
to the grantor or his heirs, is not sound. It assumes the clause to be
self-executing. The learning as to conditions . .. is altogether inap-
plicable. The title passed absolutely by the deed, and that clause is
only a covenant (italics ours), agreement by the parties, that if the
grantees should violate any of the trusts declared, then the property
ipso facto should revert to the grantor without any entry or other form
of transmitting title to real estate. It would seem not to have been so
considered by the grantor, in as much as he lived ten years or more
after the breach now complained of, receiving the support provided
in the deed, and without any assertion of right claimed for the alleged
violation of duty on the part of the grantees. The courts in such cases
will look to the good sense and sound equity, to the object and spirit
of the contract. Courts of equity will not aid in divesting an estate for
the breach of a covenant, a contract, when a just compensation can be
made in money or other valuable thing, but will relieve against for-
feitures claimed by strict construction of any common law rule."0 8 Thus
we see the court refusing to giye effect to the apparent condition stipu-
lated in the trust deed-especially in view of the fact that the grantor
continued to recognize the validity of the trust after the supposed
breach and that strangers, claiming adversely to the trust, were seeking
to take advantage of the stipulation in the trust. Perhaps it might also
be inferred from the case that our court is averse to the creation of a
trust with a condition subsequent so that a right of entry would exist.09
In Saint Peters Church v. Bragaw,70 land was conveyed to the
plaintiff church by a deed which contained the following provision:
"In the conveyance of this property to the parties of the second part,
they are required, first, to inclose the tomb of Augustus Harvey and
wife with an iron railing; second, they shall not allow this property
to be used for a cemetery; third, in case the second party should aban-
don said property, it shall revert back to the McNair heirs, parties of
the first part". Plaintiff contracted to sell the property to the defend-
ant but the latter refused to complete the contract. His defense was
that the plaintiff could not make good title to the land by reason of the
fact that the third clause, set out above, was a condition subsequent and
"Robinson v. Ingram, 126 N. C. 327, 331, 332, 35 S. E. 612, 614 (1900).
1 SimEs, FurTmE INTEUsTs (1936) §163, n. 23.
o144 N. C. 126, 56 S. E. 688 (1907).
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that the sale of the land would constitute an abandonment of the prop-
erty and a breach of the condition, which would cause a reversion of
the land to the McNair heirs. On the trial it was admitted that there
had been no violation of the first clause as to the enclosure of the Har-
vey tomb, nor of the second clause forbidding the use of the premises
as a cemetery. The court, construing strictly the third clause, held in
favor of the plaintiff: that the sale of the land did not constitute an
abandonment of the property, in that the intention of the McNairs was
to have the premises constantly occupied by someone. The net effect
of the decision was to eliminate the condition contained in the third
clause and cut off the right of entry in the original grantors. But the
court was still troubled as to whether by the second requiremeit, that
the property should not be used as a cemetery, another condition was
annexed to the estate, or whether that prohibition should be regarded
merely as a stipulation or covenant to be enforced by a resort to the
equitable power of the court for the purpose of restraining its. violation.
However, the court decided that this clause should not be construed as
a condition subsequent but rather as a covenant or a restrictive clause,
the observance of which could be compelled by a court of equity. In
reaching this conclusion the court justified itself as follows: "The
clause under consideration has .no provision for a forfeiture, while the
next and last clause has one, showing clearly the former was intended
to operate as a covenant and not as a condition subsequent, a breach of
which may involve a forfeiture of the estate conveyed by the deed."71
A similar situation which gave the court a chance to construe the
language used strictly in favor of a covenant and against a condition sub-
sequent, was presented in the case of Carolina and Northwestern Railway
Company v. Carpenter.72 Land was conveyed by a manufacturing com-
pany to the railroad for a right of way: "Provided said railway company
locates or causes to be located within twelve months from this date, or
within three months after it begins to operate trains over said strip or
track, a sidetrack, flagstation, and other conveniences given other mill
companies, at some suitable point on said manufacturing company's
lands." In the habendum clause of the deed appeared the following
provision: "But this deed of conveyance is made upon the express
consideration that the said premises shall not be used or occupied by
the said railroad company, its successors or assigns, for any other pur-
pose or purposes than the building thereon of railway tracks or other
works and structures necessary or incident to the operation of a railroad
line . . . through . . . said land, such use and occupation to com-
mence within two years from this date, and in the event such use of
"' St. Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N. C. 126, 133, 56 S. E. 688, 691 (1907).1 165 N. C. 465, 81 S. E. 682 (1914).
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the said premises shall not be commenced within the said period, or in
the event the said premises should ever thereafter cease to be used by
said railway company ...for the purpose aforesaid, then this deed
of conveyance shall be null and void. In a civil action by the railroad
company to enjoin the defendants (including the grantor manufacturing
company) from asserting exclusive rights of possession and user of the
plaintiff's siding, freight station and right of way, the defendants justi-
fied their position on the ground that the proviso in the descriptive part
of the deed was a condition subsequent, the failure to perform which
divested the plaintiff's title and revested it in the defendant manufac-
turing company. The court held for the plaintiff. It took the position
that conditions subsequent working a forfeiture of the estate conveyed
should be strictly construed, as such conditions are not favored in the
law, and are to be taken most strongly against the grantor to prevent
forfeiture; that if the grantor had intended the proviso set out in the
descriptive part of the deed should ever take effect as a condition sub-
sequent, he would have inserted it among the conditions subsequent
expressly enumerated in the habendum; that since the proviso contained
no words of forfeiture and nothing to indicate that a failure to perform
it would avoid the deed, it should be treated merely as a covenant for
the breach of which an action for damages would lie. Thus we see
our court, even in situations where express conditions subsequent are
recognized, grasping at every straw to save the conveyance from the
ignominy of forfeiture.
While, as we have already pointed out express conditions subsequent
will be most strictly construed against forfeiture and will be construed
by our court as covenants unless clear words of re-entry or forfeiture
or reverter are inserted in the instrument, there are a few special situa-
tions where a condition will be implied in law and forfeiture will take
place even though not expressly provided for in the instrument. This
is especially true in this state where the instrument involved is a mining
lease. 8 Here is the usual set-up: A, for a nominal consideration, con-
veys Blackacre to B and his heirs for a term of 99 years giving B the
right to mine the land for minerals. B agrees to pay A as royalty one
tenth of the net proceeds of all minerals taken out. B will operate a
mine on the premises for a few years and then stop. His failure to
work the mine will operate in contemplation of law as a forfeiture of
his rights under the lease, just as though an express provision had
been inserted that he should forfeit all rights under it if his mining
operations should be abandoned for a reasonable time. Says our court:
"When his rights were once so lost, it was not necessary for the plain-
"' Conrad v. Morehead, 89 N. C. 31 (1883) ; Maxwell v. Todd, 112 N. C. 677,
16 S. E. 926 (1893); Hawkins v. Pepper, 117 N. C. 407, 23 S. E. 434 (1895).
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tiff [A] to re-enter, since the estate had vested in Pepper [B] for a
particular purpose, which appeared upon the face of the instrument,
and not subject only to the performance of an act to be done'dehors
which should give the right of re-entry and render it necessary to assert
the claim to the forfeiture by such public act."" 4
Another situation in which it is said that a condition with forfeiture
is implied is where growing timber is sold with a right to cut and
remove trees of a certain size within a specified time. Although Dean
Mordecai" and our court in Shields v. Harris"8 speak of timber deeds
as conditional transactions and place them in the same category as
mining leases, they should more properly be classified as determinable
fees, or fees on special limitation. Even in the case of Davis v. Frazier77
where timber was conveyed "subject to the following terms and con-
ditions [as to manner of cutting, use of machinery, location of tram
roais, etc.] . . .and all the timber not so cut and removed within five
years from May 25, 1905, shall revert to and become the property of
the party of the first part and her heirs and assigns", the court held
that the instrument conveyed to the grantees "a base or qualified fee in
the timber, determinable as to all timber not cut and removed within
the time specified, i.e., five years .... ,78 Furthermore, our court has
held in numerous other cases that deeds for standing timber convey a
fee simple interest in such timber as realty, determinable as to all such
timber as is not cut and removed within the time specified in the deed.79
"At the expiration of that time the estate in so much of the timber as -
had not been cut and removed would revert to the vendor, or, at least
the timber would become his absolute property."8 0 In other words, the
land would automatically revert to the vendor-a distinct characteristic
of determinable fees.
An implied condition, or condition in law, also exists in North Caro-
74Hawkins v. Pepper, 117 Y. C. 407, 415, 23 S. E. 434, 436 (1895).
1 MoRDEcAfs LAw L c-UREs (2d ed. 1916) 548, 549.
" 190 N. C. 520, 130 S. E. 189 (1925).
77 150 N. C. 447, 64 S. E. 200 (1909).
78 Cf. Hinton v. Vinson, 180 N. C. 393, 104 S. E. 897 (1920) where timber of a
certain size was conveyed by a deed which contained the clause: "And the party
of the second part accepts this deed with the condition that he . . .will erect no
mill on streams leading into the fish pond on said land. . . without making full
compensation therefor." The problem discussed was whether the clause created
an estate on condition subsequent or a mere covenant. This case is distinguishable
from the ordinary timber deed since it contained a provision relating to activity
on the land and was not confined to the cutting and removal of timber within a
specified time.
"' Bateman v. Kramer Lumber Company, 154 N. C. 248, 70 S. E. 474 (1911);
Lumber Company v. Corey, 140 N. C. 462, 53 S. E. 300 (1906) ; Bunch v. Eliza-
beth City Lumber Company, 134 N. C. 116, 46 S. E. 24 (1903); Williams v.
Parsons, 167 N. C. 529, 83 S. E. 914 (1914).
" Bunch v. Lumber Company, 134 N. C. 116, 120, 46 S. E. 24, 26 (1903).
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lina by force of a statute8 l which, in effect, provides that where real
property is leased orally or in writing for a term and the lease fixes a
definitd time for the payment of rent reserved therein, there shall be
implied a forfeiture of the term upon the lessee's failure to pay after
the lessor or his agent makes demand upon the lessee for all rent past
due; and that the lessor may forthwith enter and dispossess the tenant
without having declared a forfeiture or reserved the right of re-entry
in the lease. The statute was passed to protect landlords who made
verbal or written leases and forgot to make provision in their leases
for re-entry or non-payment of rent when due. As a consequence, it
often happened that an insolvent lessee would avoid payment of rent,
refuse to vacate, and stay on until his term expired.82 But this statute
must be read in connection with another statute83 which provides that
if the lessor brings suit to recover the demised premises upon forfeiture
for the non-payment of rent and the tenant before judgment pays or
tenders payment of the refit 'due plus interest and the costs of the
action, all further proceedings in the action shall cease. The tenant is
thus, by statute, given a species of equitable relief against forfeiture-
his payment of the principal with interest thereon plus accrued costs
being regarded as compensating for non-payment of the principal
when due.8 4
We return now to a further consideration of express conditions.
The North Carolina court, as we have already pointed out,8 5 has held
that a valid estate on condition subsequent is not created unless the
grantor or testator clearly expresses his intent to state a condition by
using, in addition to other language in the instrument, words which give
him the right to re-enter, or to declare a forfeiture, or to have the prop-
erty revert to him upon breach of the condition. Assuming that these
all-important words are missing from the instrument, we are confronted
with the problem of determining the effect of their absence upon the
court's construction of the other language in the instrument which is
not sufficient in itself to create a condition. As a general proposition
our court has held that either a covenant, a trust, an equitable charge,
or a fee simple absolute with no strings attached has been created by
the language used. As to which one of these has been created will
depend, in turn, upon the actual language used, the situation of the
parties litigant, the change in circumstances since the instrument was
"IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2343.
82 This explanation is found in Ryan v. Reynolds, 190 N. C. 563, 565, 130
S. E. 156, 158 (1925).
13 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2372.8 Robinson v. Ingran, 126 N. C. 327, 35 S. E. 612 (1900); Carolina and
Northwestern R. R. v. Carpenter, 165 N. C. 465, 81 S. E. 682 (1914); 1 TiFIANY,
REAL POPER'aY (3d ed. 1939) §215. 88 See note 66, supra.
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made, the object to be attained by the conveyance, and perhaps upon
other factors. More specifically, the problem might best be approached
by hewing out rough factual categories into which the North Carolina
cases might be placed. The cases seem to fall into three such cate-
gories: (1) cases where a condition subsequent was intended but the
conveyor used only such words as "provided" or "upon condition", or
words of similar import, to introduce the so-called clause of condition;
(2) cases where land is conveyed with a provision that the grantee
shall, in consideration of the conveyance, support and maintain the
grantor for life; (3) cases where land has-been conveyed for a specified
use or purpose, such as that of a church, school, or cemetery. These
categories are not mutually exclusive.
As falling within the first category, two cases may be commented
upon. In Hinton v. Vinson,86 the plaintiff conveyed timber of a certain
size and kind to the defendant. The deed contained the following
clause: "and the party of the secondl part accepts this deed with the
condition that he, his heirs and assigns, will erect no mill on the
streams leading into the fish pond on said land . ..without making
full compensation therefor". The defendant erected a mill on a stream
leading to the pond and so polluted the water with sawdust that the
pond below was rendered unfit for fishing. The defendant had cut and
removed $30,000 worth of timber. The plaintiff sued on the theory
that the clause in the deed had created a condition subsequent, and
that the defendant, having breached the condition, had forfeited all
his rights under the timber 'deed. Plaintiff sought not only to enjoin
defendant from further entering upon the land and cutting timber
thereon, but also to recover $30,000 as the value of the timber already
cut and $5,000 for damages done to the fish pond. The court held that
the provision in the deed was a covenant, and not a condition subse-
quent, no words of forfeiture having been used; that a breach of the
covenant could be adequately atoned for by the payment of damages-;
that it would be unfair to allow the plaintiff both to recover the land
and mulct the defendant in such heavy damages. Although the case
was sent back for a new trial, two judges, who concurred. on that
point, vigorously disagreed with the majority view that a covenant
and not a condition subsequent was created by the clause. They felt
that the words "with this condition" clearly and unambiguously indi-
cated the intention of the parties to create a condition subsequent. In
First Presbyterian Church v. Sinclair Refining Company"7 land was
conveyed to the trustees of a church for general church purposes "pro-
vided always and upon condition" that the church continue in com-
88 180 N. C. 393, 104 S. E. 897 (1920).
87 200 N. C. 469, 157 S. E. 438 (1931).
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munication with its national organization and remain subject to the
authority of the church's general assembly. The church, having always
complied with these provisions, leased the property to the dlefendant.
One of the clauses in the lease was as follows: "Lessor ...warrants
that it has an indefeasible title in fee simple to said demised prem-
ises. . . ." The defendant questioned whether the church had an inde-
feasible title in fee simple to the demised premises and had the right
to lease them for filling station purposes. The court held that the church
owned the land in fee simple absolute; that the provision in the deed
did not create a condition subsequent, there being no provision giving
the grantor the right to re-enter for condition broken nor any language
showing an intent that the property should revert to the grantor. The
court said: "Even if the language used in the instant case ...is con-
strued as a condition subsequent, by the breach of which the fee simple
estate may be defeated, in view of all the facts agreed contained in the
statement submitted to the court, such breach is so improbable that for
the purposes of this decision, such condition subsequent should be dis-
regarded. It is too remote to affect the title of the church to the lot
or parcel of land described in the lease." Both this case and the Hinton
case88 afford ample evidence of the hostility of our court to conditions
subsequent and of its desire to approach functionally the problem pre-
sented by each individual case, and, if need be, to write a condition
subsequent out of existence to attain a desirable result.
The second category-support cases. Quite frequently an elderly
person will convey land to his child or other relative in consideration
of a promise by the grantee to support the grantor during the balance
of the grantor's life. The grantee then breaches his promise to support.
The type of relief available to the grantor depends upon what construc-
tion the court puts upon the clause providing for the grantor's support.
In Helms v. Helms,s9 our court said: "A conveyance in consideration
of support to be furnished the grantor or another person oes not create
a condition unless apt words of condition are used, and even then it
will not be held to create a condition unless it is apparent from the
whole instrument that a strict condition was intended". Sufficiently
apt words to create an estate on condition subsequent in such a situation
were found in the leading case of Brittain v. Taylor,90 where John Tay-
lor agreed "to feed, clothe, and kindly care for ...Margaret Taylor
all of her natural life, and should the John G. Taylor fail to feed,
" See note 86, supra.
s9135 N. C. 164, 168, 169, 47 S. E. 415, 417 (1904), quoting I JoNEs, CON-
VEYANCING (1896) §646.
"0 168 N. C. 271, 84 S. E. 280 (1915).
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clothe and kindly care for the said Margaret Taylor, then this deed to
be null and void". In this case as well as in Huntley v. McBrayer,91
another case involving support, the magic formula for the creation of
a condition subsequent lay in the words "this deed to be null and void".
If these, or words of like import, are missing from the instrument, then
the meaning and effect of the provision for maintenance has received
different constructions, depending upon the placing of the provision
and upon other terms of the instrument in which it appears.92 In some
of the cases the provision has been dealt with as a personal covenant.3
In the cases of Perdue v. Perdue, Ricks v. Pope, and Goldsboro Lum-
ber Company v. Hines Bros. Lumber Company,94 the language con-
strued by the court to create only a personal covenant was, respectively,
as follows: "It is my will and desire that the said William Thomas
Perdue shall take care of his grandmother . . ., and also of his mother
• . .during their lifetime, and also to take care of his two sisters . . .";
"That the said Elizabeth Johnson, for and in consideration of the sum
of twenty dollars per year, said amount to be paid annually by said
Isaac Pope to said Elizabeth A. Johnson, so long as she shall live . ..
do bargain and sell, transfer and convey to the said Isaac Pope ...
"and if my present wife should survive me she shall have her life right
to and in said premises and lands for her support and for the support
of said minor heirs". In other cases the provision for support has been
construed to constitute a charge on the rents and profits from the lands,
and not upon the corpus thereof.95 In Gray v. West and Wall v. Wall,""
respectively, the language was as follows: "Arey Gray is to have her
support out of the land"; grantor conveyed land "reserving to herself
the possession, use and control of the tract- of land for and during her
natural life and reserving also the care and support of her daughter,
Margaret . . ., for and during the life of the said Margaret". In a
majority of the cases the court has construed the provision for support
as constituting an equitable lien or charge upon the land itself which
will follow the land into the hands of purchasers.97 Illustrative language
01169 N. C. 75, 85 S. E. 213 (1915).
Bailey v. Bailey, 172 N. C. 671, 90 S. E. 803 (1916).
"Taylor v. Lanier, 7 N. C. 98 (1819) ; McNeely v. McNeely, 82 N. C. 183(1880); Ricks v. Pope, 129 N. C. 52, 39 S. E. 638 (1901); Perdue v. Perdue,
124 N. C. 161, 32 S. E. 492 (1899) ; Goldsboro Lumber Company v. Hines 'Bros.
Lumber Company, 153 N. C. 49. 68 S. E. 929 (1910).
"' See note 93, supra.
"' Gray v. West, 93 N. C. 442 (1885) ; Wall v. Wall, 126 N. C. 405, 35 S. E.
811 (1900). "' See note 95, stpra.
" Woods v. Woods, 44 N. C. 290 (1853); Laxton v. Tilley, 66 N. C. 327(1872) ; Helms v. Helms, 135 N. C. 164, 47 S. E. 415 (1904) ; Bailey v. Bailey,
172 N. C. 671, 90 S. E. 803 (1916); Cook v. Sink, 190 N. C. 620, 130 S. E. 714
(1925) ; Marsh v. Marsh, 200 N. C. 746, 158 S. E. 400 (1931).
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which was held to create an equitable charge on the land may be found
in Helms v. Helms and Cook v. Sink. 8 In the former the provision
read: "and it is further understood and agreed between the parties
that the above lands shall stand good for the support and maintenance
of the said Elmira Helms during her natural life"; in the latter case
there was a devise to the testator's son and daughter but "if either of
them fail to see that their mother don't suffer their care, if either of
them fail to take care of her, their part to go to some one who will
take care of her ... "
In connection with the support cases the policy of our court is
forcefully stated in Helms v. Helms"9 as follows: "The uncertainty
into which titles would be thrown is a strong reason for construing
provisions for support as covenants and not conditions, is recognized
by the courts. To treat them as mere personal covenants, having no
security for their performance save the personal liability of the grantee
would often lead to injustice, leaving persons who had made provision
for support in old age or sickness without adequate protection or relief.
The courts have almost uniformly treated the claim for support and
maintenance as a charge upon the land which will follow it into the
hands of purchasers. In this way the substantial rights of both grantor
and grantee are preserved. 'The grantee, by accepting the deed and
entering into possession under it becomes bound by the agreement pro-
viding for the support of the grantor, and the provision for support
thus becomes equivalent to a life annuity'. Devlin on Deeds, sec. 807."
The third category-where land has been conveyed for a specified
use or purpose. Quite frequently land is conveyed to the trustees of a
church or school or other institution with a provision in the deed that.
the property is to be used for religious, educational, or other specified
purposes, but no clause of re-entry or reverter or forfeiture is included
in the deed. Time passes; the trustees find that the land has become
unsuitable for the purpose specified (or the property ceases to be used
for the particular purpose) and want to sell the land. A buyer is found
but he refuses to complete the deal because he is afraid that the trustees
hold the land upon condition subsequent and can not give good title
thereto. Under such circumstances many lawsuits have arisen in North
Carolina, and our court has consistently held that where no words of
reverter or forfeiture or re-entry are included in the deed no intention
to create a condition subsequent will be found, and a mere statement
of the purpose for which the property is to be used is not sufficient to
create such a condition; and that, generally, the trustees may give a
See note 97, supra.
135 N. C. 164, 171, 47 S. E. 415, 418 (1904).
[Vol. 19
ESTATES ON CONDITION
fee simple title to the property. 100 Sometimes, however, the language
will be construed to create a trust,'0 '-or a covenant.10 2
ALIENABILITY OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER AND OF RIGHT OF ENTRY
FOR CONDITION BROKEN
We shall first examine the law as it applies to the alienability of
rights of entry for condition broken. At common law only the grantor
or his heirs could, by re-entry, enforce a forfeiture for the breach of a
condition subsequent.'03 This rule had its origin in the feudal system
of land tenures wherein a condition was implied in law that if the ten-
ant neglected to pay or perform his service, the lord might resume his
fief. By analogy, the rule as to who could enforce the forfeiture for
breach of the condition implied in law was carried over into situations
involving the breach of express conditions.'0 4 The common law rule,
as stated above, still obtains in North Carolina. 0 5 As a corollary to
this rule, it followed that the right of entry for condition broken could
not, upon the creation of the condition subsequent, be given to a person
other than the grantor or lessor, nor could the grantor or lessor after-
wards transfer this right to a stranger. North Carolina still forbids the
transfer to a stranger of a right of entry for condition broken.106 Our
court, however, holds that this right of re-entry-invariably called a
"possibility of reverter"-may be released by the grantor or his heirs
to the grantee.'0 7
It is difficult to understand why, in North Carolina today, a right
of entry for condition broken should not be assignable. At common law
a right of entry was regarded as a mere possibility of an estate-a
species of chose in action-the assignment of which, according to a
rationale imputed to Lord Coke, would be champertous; and the as-
signment would encourage litigation. However, Tiffany points out that
"
0
'St. James v. Bagley, 138 N. C. 383, 50 S. E. 769 (1905); Hall v. Quinn,
190 N. C. 326, 130 S. E. 18 (1925); Tucker v. Smith, 199 N. C. 502, 154 S. E.
826 (1930); First Presbyterian Church v. Sinclair Refining Company, 200 N. C.
469, 157 S. E. 438 (1931) ; Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. -C. 298, 1 S. E. (2d) 845
(1939) ; Williams v. Thompson, 216 N. C. 292, 4 S. E. (2d) 609 (1939) : it is
believed, however, that the court erred in holding that no trust was created in this
case.e,, Shannonhouse v. Wolfe, 191 N. C. 769, 133 S. E. 93 (1926); Shields v.
Harris, 190 N. C. 520, 130 S. E. 189 (1925) (Trust was nullified by legislative
act).
102 Saint Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N. C. 126, 56 S. E. 688 (1907).
11 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §208.
10, Ibid.
" 
1Wellons v. Jordan, 83 N. C. 371 (1880); Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C.
271, 84 S. E. 280 (1915).10' Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C. 206, 49 S. E. 110 (1904) ; Brittain v. Taylor,
168 N. C. 271, 84 S. E. 280 (1915); Sharpe v. North Caroliffa R. R., 190 N. C.
350, 129 S. E. 826 (1925).
"
7Huntley v. McBrayer, 169 N. C. 75, 85 S. E. 213 (1915) ; Sharpe v. North
Carolina R. R., see note 106, supra.
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the more acceptable theory for the nonassignability rule was "that rights
of entry or action are strictly personal, and that one who had merely a
right of entry had nothing capable of manual transfer, the only mode
of transfer recognized in early times".108 This reason, or these reasons,
furnish no rational basis for the continuation of the rule under modern
legal conditions in North Carolina. No citation of authority is necessary
for the proposition that choses in action are generally assignable, or that
the transfer of an interest in land is effective without any manual or
symbolic transfer of the land itself under our "real-party-in-interest"
statute.109 An assignee of the right of entry of a person who has been
disseized of his land by an adverse possessor may sue in his own name
to recover the land from the adverse possessor.10 90 (A conveyance of
this sort was condemned as being champertous at common law.) Why
should the assignee of a right of re-entry for condition broken not be
permitted to sue in his own name to recover the land upon breach of
the condition? Furthermore, since North Carolina has recognized the
assignability of contingent remainders and executory interests in favor
of ascertained persons, 110 there is no reason why the possibility of an
estate represented by the right to enforce a condition subsequent should
not be transferable.111 To these arguments the North Carolina court
has given a short answer: "While it is true that contingent interests
and choses in action are assignable in equity, and under our code ac-
tions may be brought in the name of the assignee, we find no case hold-
ing that a bare possibility of reverter comes within this principle."' 12
To remedy the situation the North Carolina legislature should pass a
statute, similar to those existing in other states,118 which would spe-
cifically make a right of entry for condition broken transferable by
deed. England, by statute, many years ago authorized both the devise
and assignment of such a right.'1 4
However, we must not overlook the fact that North Carolina has
already enacted a statute 15 which permits a testator to devise (among
other things) "all rights of entry for condition broken, and other rights
of entry". This language clearly seems broad enough to permit the
testator to devise a right of entry whether the condition has been broken
or not during his lifetime. But the teeth of the statute have been pulled
08 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §209, p. 352.10 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §446.
109" Ibid.
.
1 Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 315 (1905).
"I 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §209.
"'Helms v. Helms, 137 N. C. 206, 209, 49 S. E. 110. 111 (1904).
"'
3 For example! CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §1046; CONN. STAT. (1930)
§5033; MicH. Comp. LAWS (Mason's Supp., 1933) §§12966-2.
I41 Vicr. c. 26, §3(1837) ; 8 & 9 VxcT. C. 106, §6 (1845).115N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4164.
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by the construction placed upon it by our court in the case of Methodist
Protestant Church v. Young."' In that case the court held that if the
condition has not been broken during the testator's lifetime, he could
not devise the contingent right of entry; that if and when the condition
was broken, the right of entry would pass to his heirs as in the case of
an intestacy. A case may be put which will illustrate the effect of this
decision. A has acquired several tracts of land during his lifetime but
he has sold one of these tracts to B and his heirs upon a valid condition
subsequent. At the time of A's death B has not breached the condition.
A, by his will, devises "all his property of whatsover kind and where-
soever situate" to his wife C and her heirs. C will take all of A's prop-
erty except the right of entry retained by A in the tract of land conveyed
to B which right will pass by descent to A's heirs-nieces and nephews,
children of A's deceased brothers and sisters. If we assume that these
heirs of A are scattered throughout the United States, and further that
B or his heirs or their grantees do not breach the condition for many
years to come, how, as a practical matter, is the title to the particular
tract of land conveyed to B ultimately going to be cleared? If the right
of entry had passed to C by A's will, the cloud on title could perhaps be
removed. immediately by C's release to B of the right of entry. To cure
the defect in the present statute1 7 brought about by its construction in
Church v. Young,1 8 an amendment has already been proposed by the
Commission on Revision of the Laws of North Carolina Relating to
Estates." 9 The pertinent portion of the statute, as amended, would
read as follows: "and also to all rights of entry for condition broken,
whether any such condition has or has not been broken at the testator's
death, all other rights of entry, and possibilities of reverter".
The common law rule which prohibited the sale of a right of entry
for breach of condition was changed by statute120 in England. in 1540
in the instance where the grantor or lessor sold or leased an estate for
life or for years on condition and thus retained in himself both, a rever-
sion and a right of entry. This statute permitted the assignee of the
reversion to take advantage of the breach of the condition. This statute
has been made a part of the present law of North Carolina.' 2'
May we, at this point, consider briefly the effect of an attempted
conveyance of a right of entry expectant upon a fee simple estate. Ac-
cording to the majority view in the United States "if an attempt is made
to convey a right of entry for breach of condition which is unaccom-
panied by any reversion, the interest of the conveyor is thereby for-
118130 N. C. 8, 40 S. E. 691 (1902).
111 See note 115, supra. ... See note 116, supra.
11. See the second Report of the Commission at pages 84 and 85.
12032 HENRY VIII, c. 34, §1 (1540).
121 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2348.
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feited", and the original grantee takes a fee simple absolute.122 No case
directly in point has been found in. North Carolina, but a dictum in the
case of Huntley v. McBrayer123 leads us to the conclusion that this
state would follow the rule of the majority. The reason usually assigned
for the rule is that the grantor by attempting to sell the right of re-entry
has committed a chanpertous act-he has sold a potential lawsuit-and
should be penalized therefor. It is believed that the courts have merely
seized upon this technicality to "cut the string" that prevents the holder
of an estate on condition from holding a fee simple absolute.
May possibilities of reverter expectant upon fees determinable be
assigned in North Carolina? No case dealing with the question has
been found.124 In several cases125 our court has declared that "possibili-
ties of reverter" cannot be assigned, but in each case the interest in-
volved was not a possibility of reverter expectant upon a fee determinable
but was a right of entry growing out of a fee on condition subsequent.
However, our conjecture is that, for purposes of assignment, the North
Carolina court would treat the possibility of reverter as an interest
essentially like a right of entry and would say that it too could not be
assigned. We have already suggested that a statute should be passed
expressly permitting the sale of a right of entry; we would also include
within the terms of this statute a possibility of reverter.
It has been held, even in jurisdictions where possibilities of reverter
are inalienable, that an attempted alienation does not forfeit the in-
terest.12 6 No cases have been found to indicate what view the North
Carolina court would take as to the effect of an attempted alienation of
a possibility of reverter.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have shown beyond any doubt, that North Caro-
lina has recognized the right of a grantor or testator to create estates
which are determinable by virtue of their own special limitations and
also estates subject to divestment upon the happening of a condition
subsequent. In other words, the conveyancer is allowed to use these
devices to qualify or restrict the estate created. In lieu of either of
11 13 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §717. Perhaps the leading case on the
point is Rice v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 12 Allen 141 (Mass., 1866).
- 169 N. C. 75, 85 S. E. 213 (1915) : "A conveyance of the premises by the
grantor to a stranger has been held as operating to extinguish the grantor's rights
in certain cases."
2'The case of Blue v. Wilmington, 186 N. C. 321, 119 S. E. 741 (1923) has
been cited in 3 SimEs, FuTuaE INTERESTS (1936) §715, n. 63, for the proposition
that a possibility of reverter is inalienable but a close examination of that case
will reveal that the court was discussing the alienability of such an interest on
the basis of a fee on condition mbsequent.
1" See note 106, supra.
"13 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §717.
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these, he also has the choice of a restrictive covenant, an equitable
servitude, or a trust-depending upon which device will best effectuate
his purpose under the circumstances of the particular situation. Un-
questionably the retention by the conveyancer of a possibility of re-
verter after, a fee determinable or of a right of entry after a fee on
condition subsequent places the title to the land, so far as the holder
thereof is concerned, in a precarious condition. 27 The land may be
transferred by the immediate grantee or devisee, but its marketability
will be seriously hampered because of the restrictions placed upon it;
then, perhaps after many years have passed, if the contingency happens
or if the condition is broken, the land will either automatically revert
to the grantor or his heirs -or it will be subject to divestment at their
election. In either case the resultant effect on titles is a drastic one.
The ultimate clearance of the title is further impeded by the fact that
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are not within the purview
of the rule against perpetuities.'28 Since these things are so, we are led
to inquire into the feasibility of placing some legislative curb upon the
creation of such defeasible interests in land. Both Massachusetts and
Minnesota have, by statute,129" attempted to place some limits upon the
erection of estates on condition subsequent. Both statutes provide, in
effect, that conditions or restrictions, which affect the title to real
property, shall terminate at the end of thirty years from the effective
date of the instrument in which the conditions or restrictions are set
up. Massachusetts makes an exception in the cases of gifts or devises
for public, charitable or religious purposes. The Minnesota statute tends
to minimize the undesirable features of rights of entry by further pro-
viding that when a condition "shall become merely nominal and of no
actual and substantial benefit" to the party intended to be benefitted,
it may be disregarded. The Minnesota statute seems to be the prefer-
able one of the two. No statutes attempting to regulate fees determi-
nable have been found.
As to North Carolina, we are not inclined to suggest that a statute
be passed which would have the effect of totally abolishing the right
to create a fee determinable or a fee on condition subsequent. Such
estates still have some social utility, especially in those cases where
there is a gift or devise of property for public, charitable or religious
purposes. Nor would we go so far as to recommend that this state
adopt a statute, similar to those enacted in Massachusetts or Minne-
I" See Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter As Devices to
Restrict the Use of Land (1940) 54 HA.v. L. Rav. 248; White, Reversionar3f
Restrictions (1940) 14 U. oF Cin. L. REv. 524.
122 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §§506, 507.
.. MAss. LAws ANN. (Michie, 1932) c. 184, §23; MrNx. STATS. (Mason,
Supp. 1940) §8075.
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sota, for the purpose of placing some check on conditions. A preferable
and more flexible plan seems already to be in operation in this state-
that of allowing the court, without legislative interference, to construe
each case on its facts as it is presented. As we have already pointed
out, our court, with an avowed hostility to conditions, has effectively
checked their use by stricter than usual requirements for their creation
and by a broad constructional policy whereby the court will find no
condition at all if the circumstances of the case warrant a finding other-
wise. Indeed, we have about come to the conclusion that both fees de-
terminable and fees on condition subsequent have been treated by our
court as unwanted guests in our jurisprudential house-but guests,
which, by virtue of their age, must be accorded a modicum of respect.
